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LOAN PARTICIPATIONS: ARE THEY "SECURITIES"?
DENNIS SCHOLL*
RONALD L. WEAVER**
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in the law governing loan participation
agreements among banks are of great consequence to the legal,
banking, general financial and corporate borrowing communities.
They especially affect everyday efforts of small and medium sized
banks and other banks with limited lending ability to serve the
financial needs of larger bank customers.
Banks use loan participation to retain and service large custom-
ers primarily on a sole basis, to develop corresponding banking re-
lationships and to obtain potentially profitable loans which they
would not have an opportunity to make on an individual basis.
Typically, when a bank borrower applies for a loan which the bank
is unable to make due to statutory lending limitations on loan
amounts to customers, the bank will seek out additional banks to
join together and each lend a portion in order to accumulate the
amount necessary to meet the customer's needs. The original bank
becomes the "lead" bank and will negotiate the terms of the loan
with the borrower. An information packet is presented to the par-
ticipating banks who usually evaluate the borrower and the terms
before deciding whether to proceed, and if so, in what amount.'
The banks that elect to proceed either execute individual loan
agreements with the borrower or enter into a participation agree-
ment with the lead bank. In the latter case, only one note is signed
between the lead bank and the borrower. There is no substantive
difference between the two methods as far as reviewing whether
they fall under the ambit of securities laws.'
Of special significance on a practical level is the case law devel-
oping around the attempted characterization of loan participation
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1. Armstrong, The Developing Law of Participation Agreements, 23 Bus. LAW. 689
(1968).
2. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
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agreements as securities within the meaning of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19343 and other federal and state securities laws.
The substantial consequences such a characterization has on the
banking industry, including potential business dislocation, rescis-
sion, fines and even criminal penalties make necessary a careful
but practical analysis of the question-when, if ever, are loan par-
ticipations securities?
As this article will show (and the accompanying char graphi-
cally demonstrates) there is an emerging doctrine from the courts
that a loan participation agreement generally is not treated as a
security unless it has a preponderance of the following
characteristics: 5
1. an unfixed interest rate on the loan or an equity kicker built
into the return on the loan,'
2. an unsecured or minimally secured loan,7
3. a borrower without accessible or preservable cash flow or net
worth with which to repay the loan,s
4. a lead bank which has:
(a) sole or primary and virtually exclusive access to bor-
rower information,' and
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1976) (hereinafter referred to as "1934 Act").
4. See Chart at pp. 224-25, infra.
5. These characteristics are used to distinguish between investments, which generally are
covered by the 1934 Act, and commercial transactions, which generally do not fall under the
scope of the act.
6. This feature reflects the distinction between capital at risk and the nature of a loan
transaction. A fixed interest rate negates the risk factor inherent in a true capital invest-
ment. See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651
F.2d 1174, 1184-85 (6th Cir.) (fixed rate of return in the form of interest does not satisfy the
"reasonable expectation of profits" prong of the "modified Howey" test) (see infra notes 29-
38, 51-56 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 102,S. Ct. 972 (1981). See also infra note 71
and accompanying text. An "equity kicker" is a term of art in the banking business and
involves a loan arrangement under which a bank lends money at a lower rate of interest and
makes up the difference by taking a share of the borrower's profits from the project for
which the loan was made.
7. Reliable accessible collateral is a traditional feature of a loan. It is therefore contrain-
dicative of a capital investment in a security. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
8. However, as one court noted, even a commercially risky loan is not the same as an
investment risk without other factors. Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1043
(7th Cir. 1979).
9. When a participant bank chooses not to exercise its right to investigate the borrower
he is not entitled to the protection of the securities laws when the borrower defaults. See
Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977). However, when the information is not
available to a participating lender the lead bank may have a greater obligation to inform the
participant. The failure to meet this obligation may make a court more likely to view the
transaction as a security. Whether a security is involved or not depends upon the economic
realities of the transaction in light of congressional intent. United Housing Found., Inc. v.
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(b) primary or exclusive control of loan administration and
enforcement upon default,"
5. a lead lender which has greater sophistication in lending than
the participant," and
6. a purpose involving a new, unique or speculative venture
rather than a relatively risk-free venture."'
Generally, the courts have attempted to distinguish the promis-
sory note which is being participated in from the participation
transaction itself in determining if a security is present. Under this
analysis, the focus is on the transaction and the general rule is that
the transaction may be considered a security even if the note itself
is not.' 3 This is in contrast to early literal readings of the 1934 Act
which focused on the underlying promissory notes to determine
whether securities were involved.14
In examining participation transactions, recent rulings have con-
sidered the economics and practicalities of the banking process and
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-49 (1975). If the economic reality is that a participant bank is
damaged by a lead bank's omission of material information to which the participant is enti-
tled then the transaction or participation is one which may fall within the intent of the 1934
Act. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
But see United American Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980) (borrower
financial statement not forwarded to plaintiff participant by lead bank until two months
after agreement to participate. In the absence of misrepresentation the court declined to
find the omission to be a security law violation, even if the participation agreement could
have been considered a security).
10. The fourth prong of the Howey test for identifying a security is that the expected
profits be derived from the managerial or entrepreneurial efforts of others. See infra notes
30-32, 57-63 and accompanying text. There are two aspects to this prong. First, a partner
who has the legal right to assert some voice in managerial matters but chooses not to cannot
claim to have relied on the efforts of others to satisfy the test. See, e.g., Elson v. Geiger, 506
F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Second, the lead bank's administration of a fixed inter-
est loan without involvement in the profits of the business' entrepreneurial effort will not
satisfy the test either. See, e.g., American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp.,
Inc., 635 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). This Court
stated that the interest the participant earned, which was fixed at a certain rate above
prime, "did not derive from the Mortgage Company's entrepreneurial services within the
meaning of Forman but from the underlying notes." Id. at 1255.
11. See infra text accompanying note 65.
12. See American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp. 635 F.2d at 1254;
Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d at 1043.
13. See, e.g., American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247.
(The court did not dispute the parties agreement that "a participation may be a security
even though the underlying note is not." Id. at 1253). See also Commercial Discount Corp.
v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). "It is quite logical,
and is moreover well established, that a participation in a loan may be a security, even
though the underlying loan is not." Id. at 1267.
14. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d at 992.
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concentrated primarily on the characteristics of the loan, the
lender and the borrower. Decisions of the last five years have al-
most uniformly determined that loan participation agreements not
having a preponderance of the characteristics listed above are not
securities. 15 However, no court has unequivocally stated that a loan
participation may never be a security. Indeed, certain recent hold-
ings, while in the minority, raise the possibility that a federal se-
curities law violation can be committed by a lead bank in connec-
tion with the participation of loans. 16 Therefore, the gauging of
legal duties in such agreements requires concentration not so much
on rarefied securities law concepts as on the factual circumstances
under which one bank agrees to participate in part of a loan to
another. The resulting application of the above described risk fac-
tors is the litmus test for the existence of a security and hence the
finding of a securities law violation.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF A FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW VIOLATION
The uncertain state of the economy, increasing bankruptcies,
bad loans and resulting litigation about the status of loan partici-
pation as securities create grave practical consequences in the
event of a determination that there has been a securities law viola-
tion. The potential for damages in the event of a violation is
substantial.
The Supreme Court has established that the definition of a se-
curity for 1933 Act1 7 purposes is virtually identical to that for 1934
Act purposes. 18 As a result, a loan participation transaction and
the potential for subsequent securities litigation impacts duties
and penalties under both acts. Registration requirements and anti-
15. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc.,
651 F.2d 1174; American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247;
United American Bank of Nashville v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1109; United California Bank v.
THC Financial Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977); Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz,
532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976); Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Samuel T. Isaac and Assocs.,
Inc., 496 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. 238; Manchester Bank
v. Connecticut Bank and Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 1304 (D.N.H. 1980); Provident Nat'l Bank
v. Frankford Trust Co., 468 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1979); F.B.S. Financial, Inc. v. Cleve-
Trust Realty Investors, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,341 (N.D. Ohio 1977). But see, Ex-
change Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976); Commercial Dis-
count Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1263.
16. Commercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1263.
17. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
1S. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. at 335-36 ("The Securities Act of 1933... contains
a definition of security virtually identical to that contained in the 1934 Act") (footnote and
citation omitted).
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fraud rules under state and federal laws arise to create substantial
differences in compliance and exposure once the definitional
threshold is crossed and a loan participation is found to be a
security.
Registration expense, increased offering memoranda obligations,
the consequences of private actions under Rule 10b-5 19 and possi-
bly section 17(a) of the 1933 Act20 and other disclosure require-
ments are expensive results that buyers of bank loans will have
passed on to them unless the definition of "securities" is confined
to true investments rather than typical commercial transactions.
Subjecting loan participations to the anti-fraud provisions of the
1934 Act 2 ' and their primary progeny, Rule 10b-5,2 2 also carries
grave consequences including stricter disclosure requirements for
lead lenders. Further, characterizing loan participations as securi-
ties regulated by the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 may give dissatisfied
participants access to the federal courts to air their grievances.
2 3
These types of commercial grievances can and usually should be
adequately adjudicated in state courts on common law doctrines of
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and breach of contract. The diffi-
cult standards of proof and reluctance of courts to impose liability
for negligent nondisclosure or erroneous disclosure reflect the well-
considered policy against allowing all but the most serious claims
of omissions and misrepresentations to be challenged under the
1934 Act.2 ' This is supported by recent Supreme Court decisions
denying implied rights of private action in numerous federal statu-
tory provisions.2
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
20. 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1976). But see Scholl & Perkowski, A Private Right of Action
Under Section 17(a): The Supreme Court has Said "No" But is Anybody Listening?. 36 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1981).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j, 78r, 78z (1976).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
23. Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974).
24. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeller, 425 U.S. 185, 199-201 (1976) (scienter required
for recovery under Rule lOb-5).
25. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no im-
plied right of private action under § 206 of Investment Advisors Act of 1940); Touche Ross
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied right of private action under § 17(a) of 1934
Securities Exchange Act); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (no implied right of
private action under the Freedom of Information Act to enjoin agency disclosure). But see
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implied right of action under Title IX
of Education Amendments Act of 1972). One commentator set forth an apt understanding
of the Supreme Court's antipathy toward over-extension of the securities laws by stating.
"There can be little doubt about the intensity of the Court's concern over the expansion of
securities liability and its determination to curb [that expansion]." 1 A. BRoMBERG & L.
19821
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Similarly, application of the antifraud provisions to an industry
already governed by a substantial regulatory scheme would create
an unnecessary overlap in federal review. The highly regulated
banking industry already contains established statutory safeguards
for both depositors and shareholders. To expose banks to another
layer of SEC requirements with regard to an everyday commercial
transaction would impose substantial expenses and increase the
risks of breaches of confidentiality in the banking system.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES A "SECURITY" IN THE CONTEXT OF A
LOAN PARTICIPATION
Despite the recent decisions which suggest that typical loan par-
ticipations are not securities, several basic issues remain unsettled.
Even the proper definition of a "security" remains less than
certain.
The definitional section of the 1934 Act states that:
When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires...
(10) [t]he term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral roy-
alty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,: preorganization cer-
tificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security or in
general, any instrument commonly known as a "security;" or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificates for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or
any note, draft, bill or exchange or banker's acceptance which has
a maturity at the time of issuance of days of grade, or any re-
newal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.2
While this definition appears sufficiently broad to include loan
participation agreements, a literal reading is not determinative if,
as the statute notes, "the context otherwise requires. 27 In fact, in
determining the scope of the term "security," the Supreme Court
has thoughtfully insisted that "application [of the securities law]
LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, SEC. 2.4(310), p. 2:108 (1982).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (emphasis added).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a). See Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d
1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976) (party asserting that an instrument is not within the literal
provision of the act has the burden of showing that "the context, othewise requires").
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turns on the economic realities underlying the transaction. ' 2 8 The
Court has gone so far as to say that:
[C]ourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its
dominating general purpose, will read the text in the light of con-
text and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words
fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally
expressed legislative policy.29
Considering the "economic realities" involves measuring the loan
participation by the four standards of the accepted current judicial
outline of the elements of a security set forth in Securities and
Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co.30 As modified by the
United Housing, Inc. v. Forman decision, 1 the Howey test defines
a security as (1) the presence of an investment (2) in a common
venture (3) premised on a reasonable expectation of profits (4) to
be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others."2
Although simply stated, the Supreme Court has offered little
guidance on how the modified Howey test is to be applied. District
and circuit courts have not always agreed in their application of
it,33 especially in a commercial context where both parties have a
28. United Housing Foundation Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848-51, reh'g denied, 423
U.S. 884 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. at 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293 (1946).
29. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). See also Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
30. 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (hereinafter referred to in text as Howey).
31. 421 U.S. 837.
32. Id. at 852.
33. The Third, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits generally utilize an "investment-com-
mercial" test. The test centers around judicial concern that the securities laws regulate in-
vestment transactions, but not commercial transactions. Consequently, the focus of the test
is whether a given transaction is commerical or investment in nature. See, e.g., McGovern
Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors, 562 F.2d 645, 647 (10th Cir.
1977); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir.
1973).
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits employ a risk capital analysis. This analysis is concerned
with whether the transaction involves "risk capital" and, to that end, considers six factors.
The six factors are time, collateralization, form of obligation, circumstances of issuance, con-
templated use of the funds, and the relationship between the amount borrowed and the size
of the borrower's business. See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Busi-
ness Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d at 1181-82 (6th Cir), cert. denied 102 S. Ct. 972 (1981); Amfac
Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 431-32 (9th Cir. 1978).
The Second Circuit uses a more literal approach. That approach is, at least, strongly re-
lated to a list of exceptions to the general literal rule. The exceptions include: notes deliv-
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high level of business and economic sophistication. Twice in recent
months the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in cases seeking a
determination of whether loan participations are securities. In
April, 1981 the Court refused such consideration in a loan partici-
pation case. 4 in which the Seventh Circuit used an "investment-
commercial" analysis" to find that a loan participation was not a
security." The Court also denied certiorari in a case from the
Sixth Circuit in which the appellant sought to apply a "risk capi-
tal" analysis to a commercial loan participation in an unsuccessful
attempt to find the existence of a security.3 7 Based upon the Su-
preme Court's reluctance to review this issue, an examination of
lower court decisions remains the only way to uncover the develop-
ment of any consistency in the applications of the Howey test in
this area. There are dozens of such state and federal interpreta-
tions thus far, with the primary ones being reviewed herein.a
IV. APPLICATION OF THE Howey TEST
A. Presence of an Investment
Although all four factors of the Howey test are generally consid-
ered together, a court's finding of this first and most important
factor, the presence of an investment, 9 is often dispositive of the
issue. Consideration of this Howey component, however, is the
most difficult, for as one court expressed it:
[In one sense every lender of money is an investor since he places
his money at risk in anticipation of a profit in the form of inter-
ered in consumer financing, notes secured by mortgages on homes, notes evidencing "char-
acter" loans to bank customers, short-term notes secured by liens on small businesses or
their assets, and short-term notes secured by assignment of accounts receivable. See, e.g.,
Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d at 1138.
One commentator recently reviewed the application of Howey in the context of the sale of
a business and whether such a transaction fell within the ambit of the securities laws. He
too found a wide divergence in the courts at the district and circuit levels. Seldin, When a
Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business Doctrine" Under The Federal Securities
Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 (1981).
34. American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247, cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
35. See discussion of the "investment-commercial" analysis infra at note 33.
36. 635 F.2d at 1254.
37. 651 F.2d 1174. See supra note 33 for a review of the factors used by the Sixth Circuit
in applying their risk capital analysis.
38. See chart on pp. 224-25 for an analysis of the leading cases and their distinguishing
factors.
39. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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est. Also in a broad sense every investor lends his money to a
borrower who uses it for a price and is expected to return it one
day.40
Only an examination of the context in which the transaction
took place aids a court in determining whether the bank was pro-
viding money for a low-risk commercial lending transaction or
funding a higher-risk capital investment scheme. Attached hereto
is a chart 41 which uses the eight factors characterizing this context
to evaluate the seminal 1969 Lehigh Valley case,42 and determine
whether the loan participation in question was a "security." The
eight analyzed factors are: (1) powers of the participant; (2) loan
collateral; (3) loan duration; (4) type of return on the loan; (5)
description of the participant; (6) characterization of the transac-
tion by the parties; (7) intended use of the borrowed funds; and,
(8) creditworthiness of the borrower.
A typical commercial loan involves well-collateralized notes from
creditworthy borrowers for relatively nonspeculative purposes.
Usually the loan participant has full access to borrower informa-
tion and the right to monitor loan enforcement, regardless of
whether the right is exercised or not. This creates a sophisticated
commercial environment in which few cases have determined that
a security is present.48 Of the twelve representative cases listed in
the chart, only in two did the court find loan participations to be
"securities;" in ten cases, the courts did not make such a finding. 4
In the two cases in which the courts found securities to be present,
participants were denied meaningful access to information because
of geographic isolation4 5 and the significant managerial and admin-
istrative rights over loan collateral, terms of the loan and foreclo-
sure resided only in the lead lender.4
40. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d at 1359.
41. See chart at pp. 224-25, infra.
42. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank, 409 F.2d 989.
43. See Great Western Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d at 1260 (Wright, J. concurring)
(Judge Wright's survey of the then-existing case law revealed only one instance, Young v.
Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973), where a federal court had ruled that a
note given by a borrower to a bank in a commercial loan transaction was a security). Id. at
1260 n.1.
44. See chart at pp. 224-25, infra.
45. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank, 409 F.2d at 993.
46. Commercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp. at 1265,
1268.
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B. Common Venture
The second prong of the Howey test involves the presence of a
common venture. The question of commonality remains unsettled
and the courts are divided as to whether a horizontal or vertical
relationship satisfies the common venture requirement of Howey."
Courts which find that horizontal relationships are sufficient to
create common ventures48 rely upon the fact that an individual in-
vestor has pooled the monies of several investors in one enterprise.
Other courts find that vertical relationships are common ventures
any time the profitability of one investor's funds are dependent
upon the expertise of another, i.e., the promoter.4 9 Although both
determinants of whether there is a common venture have merit,
most courts have given little weight to this factor and determine
on the security status of a loan participation without delving into a
common venture analysis.50
C. A Reasonable Expectation of Profits
Typical judicial examination of the factor requiring a reasonable
expectation of profits has centered on the form of profit being de-
rived in the loan participation. While the fixed rates of return in a
typical commercial loan are literally "profits," many courts have
justifiably recognized that such a literal interpretation could
render meaningless any distinction between commercial and in-
vestment transactions and require the application of the securities
laws to any transaction which has the potential for any form of
return."
The more closely a loan participation resembles a low-risk, fixed-
return commercial transaction, the more likely that it will not be
found to be a security. Applying this standard, notes issued in a
low-risk, fixed-return commercial transaction have generally been
found to be outside the parameters of the securities laws.52 For ex-
47. See e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir.
1980) (horizontal relationship sufficient). But see e.g., SEC v. Continental Commodities
Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974) (vertical relationship sufficient).
48. See e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 622 F.2d 216, 222.
49. See e.g., SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522.
50. See e.g., Manchester Bank v. Connecticut Bank and Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 1304
(D.N.H. 1980); F.B.S. Financial, Inc. v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, [1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,341.
51. See e.g., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland, 615 F.2d 465,
470 (7th Cir. 1980); Great Western Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d at 1258-59; Bellah v.
First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d at 1114.
52. See, cases cited supra note 13.
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ample, in Marine Bank v. Weaver,"3 the United States Supreme
Court recently held that a six-year certificate of deposit issued by a
federally regulated bank was not a security within the meaning of
the 1934 Act. The Court gave two main reasons for its decision:
first, certificates of deposit pay a fixed rate of interest which is in
no way dependent on the profits of the issuer. Second, the 1934
Act is not necessary to protect bank depositors since they already
are adequately protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC) and other federal banking laws.
Before one relies entirely on the form of profit generated to de-
termine if a security exists, it is important to note that the securi-
ties laws provide for the regulation of instruments that yield a
fixed rate of return".5 The Supreme Court, however, has further
defined profits under the Howey test, so that "[b]y profits, the
Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting from the de-
velopment of the initial investment. . . or a participation in earn-
ings resulting from the use of investors' funds."'15 Where banks ad-
vance funds in a typical commercial lending transaction and
generate a predetermined rate of return subject not to the bor-
rower's rate of profit but to the prevailing prime rate of interest,
the courts generally find that such a transaction does not evidence
a security and is not subject to the regulation of the state or fed-
eral securities laws.6
D. Profits Derived from the Entrepreneurial Efforts of Others
The final Howey test element requires that the profits obtained
by a lender through the advance of funds be derived from the
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts of others. Under this part of
the Howey test, a loan participation is not a security so long as the
participant has a meaningful and proportionate voice in the
financial management and monitoring of the loan.57 Courts have
also reached this conclusion when loan participants obtain certain
loan monitoring rights inherent in a typical participation agree-
ment. For example, the rights to demand foreclosure of the loan to
53. 637 F.2d 157 (3 Cir. 1980), rev'd 50 U.S.L.W. 4285 (Mar. 8, 1982). See also, Ayala v.
Jamaica Savings Bank [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,041
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(1)(10).
55. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
56. See cases cited supra note 15.
57. See e.g., Great Western Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d at 1259; Elson v. Geiger,
506 F. Supp. at 243.
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prevent alterations in the collateral and to veto modification of the
terms of the obligation have been held to be sufficient of a manage-
rial rights that the loan participations in question were not securi-
ties.5 8 However, even when such oversight powers are not obtained
by the participants and the lead lender exclusively manages the
loan, several courts find that a retention of the routine duties of
loan administration by the lead lender does not change this re-
sult.5 9 This theory considers the economic reality of loan participa-
tion notes and concludes that by the very nature of participations,
maximum efficiency results from centering administrative duties in
one bank. 0
Even in a case where the lead lender held sole responsibility for
administering a $49 million construction loan, participated in by
four other banks, the court noted that such centering of adminis-
trative responsibilities did not necessarily mean that the partici-
pants had the legal right to look to the administrative efforts of the
lead lender for their interest income. 1 The court recognized in-
stead that the sophisticated participant bank investor looks to the
entrepreneurial efforts of the borrower for its profit, not to the ef-
forts of the lead lender to perform ministerial functions with re-
spect to the loan. 2 As such, the participants had no right to dam-
ages from the lead lender under the federal securities laws.6 8
V. GUIDELINES FOR STRUCTURING LOAN PARTICIPATIONS THAT
ARE NOT SECURITIES
Courts consistently try to exclude most commercial (as distinct
from investment) transactions from the reach of the securities reg-
ulations. One reason for such judicial antipathy to commercially
sophisticated plaintiffs in the area of federal securities laws is the
realization that traditional commercial transactions involve fewer
risks of loss than investment transactions and usually are ade-
quately regulated by other state and federal laws. Few enterprises
are more regulated than commercial lending in such areas as to
58. See e.g., American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d at
1254; Provident Nat'l Bank v. Frankford Trust Co., 468 F. Supp. at 455.
59. See e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651
F.2d at 1185; F.B.S. Financial, Inc. v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,341 at 93,159.
60. See cases cited supra note 15.
61. F.B.S. Financial, Inc. v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,341 at 93,159.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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whom loans can be made, loan amounts, loan ratios and collateral,
especially after the federal laws enacted in 1978 concerning these
matters."'
Another traditional feature of a commercial transaction is the
advance of money for a short period of time. The longer funds are
held or used by another, the greater the risk of loss and the more
likely it is that the transaction will be characterized as an invest-
ment under the Howey test. 5
Another commercial characteristic is the existence of substantial
collateral for the advance of funds. While a secured lender may
look to the collateral in the event of the borrower's inability to
repay the loan, an unsecured investor is generally more dependent
upon the ability and efforts of others to generate a profit. The
profit in a loan participation emanates from the borrower, not the
lead lender, as it is the borrower who will post the collateral and
generate the funds to repay the debt and the profit on it. The lead
lender in a participation is typically an administrator as well as a
participant and has little or no effect on the profitability and re-
payment of the loan. If it oversees or exercises control over the
borrower's everyday affairs, a different result will obtain.66
To the extent that a participant's advance of funds is secured by
collateral available to (and preferably assigned on a pro-rata basis
to) the participant, the transaction is less likel to be a security.6 7
The character of the collateral is especially important. The more
valuable, reliable, liquid and accessible the collateral, the lower the
risk that a court will find a Howey type investment. Collateral
deemed adequate for this purpose in loan participation cases in-
clude: first mortgages shared pro-rata by the participant;6 an at-
tachable bank account with a required minimum balance;69 a pro-
64. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified throughout sections of 15 U.S.C.).
65. See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651
F.2d at 1182; United California Bank v. THC Financial Corp., 557 F.2d at 1358-59; Great
Western Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d at 1258.
66. See, e.g., NBI Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Chemical Bank [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 95,632 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (result determined by the man-
agement responsibilities of holder).
67. See, e.g., United California Bank v. THC Financial Corp., 557 F.2d at 1359; Great
Western Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d at 1258; F.B.S. Financial, Inc. v. CleveTrust
Realty Investors, Fed. [1978 Transfer Binder] Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,341 at 93,156.
68. See, e.g., Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. at 242; F.B.S. Financial, Inc. v. CleveTrust
Realty Investors, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,341 at 93,156; Ameri-
can Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d at 1254.
69. In Great Western Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d at 1258, the bank and the bor-
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rata interest in the borrower's accounts receivable; 0 and labor,
performance and material payment bonds coupled with a pro-rata
interest in a first mortgage.71 There are certainly other factors to
be considered and should a preponderance of other factors hereto-
fore discussed be absent even pro-rata participation in these forms
of collateral is not a certain safeguard against characterization of
the participation as a security.
Another indicator of a commercial rather than an investment
transaction is a fixed rate of return for the use of the funds. In this
context "fixed" returns include rates related to recognized indices
of the prime lending rate. 2 In contrast, "equity kickers" and other
participations in which lenders shared in borrower profits based
upon the success of the borrower's venture more closely resemble
investments typically treated as securities by the courts. 3
The intended use of the funds also bears on a commercial char-
acterization of the transactions. Borrowing for a stable and identi-
fied purpose is considered synonymous with commercial loans7 4
and the less the risk involved in the intended use, the less the like-
lihood of treatment as an investment and therefore a security.
The duties of the participant and the diligent exercise of those
duties may actually have the effect of reducing his opportunities
for a remedy under the federal securities laws. When a loan par-
ticipant exercises any type of duty under a participation, he may
be deemed to have stopped relying on the managerial or en-
trepreneurial skills of the lead lender and as such may not meet
the Howey test.7 5 The greater the participant's access to informa-
tion about the borrower and the more extensive the participant's
control over loan collateral, loan terms and loan foreclosure, the
less likely that the participation will be a security under the
Howey test. This assumes, however, that there exists a preponder-
ance of the other factors which militate against finding the exis-
rower had two concurrent transactions. The first was an unsecured note, the second was a
loan. Under the loan documents the borrower was required to keep a large compensating
balance at the bank. The Court stated that the liquid nature of this readily attachable asset
was one factor indicating the entire transaction was not one involving a security.
70. See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651
F.2d at 1182.
71. See, e.g., Provident Nat'l Bank v. Frankford Trust Co., 468 F. Supp. at 450, 455.
72. See, e.g., United American Bank v. Gunter 620 F.2d at 1111, 1118; Home Savings &
Loan Assoc. v. Samuel T. Isaac and Assocs., 496 F. Supp. at 837-38.
73. See supra note 6 for an explanation of "equity kickers."
74. See, e.g., American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d at
1254.
75. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
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tence of a security.
If the participation is structured so that the participant bank
has access to information about the borrower before advancing
funds, the courts generally do not find a security present and in
turn do not invoke the federal security laws to protect sophisti-
cated lenders who did not choose to exercise their rights."6 How-
ever, geographic and informational isolation have been found to re-
quire special efforts by the lead bank to inform the participant
about the borrower's financial status.77
VI. CONCLUSION
If the loan being participated is of a speculative nature or if the
banking entity acting as a participant lacks information and the
ability to obtain such information or the right to provide input re-
garding the structuring of the loan, possible securities laws ramifi-
cations should be considered. This inherent risk factor with its po-
tential for large amounts of exposure to the requirements of the
1934 Act creates a disturbance in normal commercial interbank
dealings and is an expensive, usually unwarranted, intrusion into
the commercial banking system. At least insofar as loan participa-
tions are concerned, the specter of the securities laws and the un-
certainty surrounding them makes free enterprise less free and
does so with little or no benefit to the investing public for whom
the securities laws were intended. A bank's strong bargaining posi-
tion usually will permit it to gain access to information necessary
to make a judgment regarding a participation. If such information
is unavailable, a bank typically will not enter into the transaction.
Application of the securities laws in a failed loan participation con-
text is typically inequitable and creates the potential of giving one
sophisticated investor an unexpected and undeserved windfall at
the expense of another in the event a loan in which they have
agreed to share the risk goes into default. To that extent, the pub-
lic that invested in the victim bank is done a totally unjustifiable
disservice. As one court stated rather acerbically, "[t]he securities
laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from
their own errors of judgment. 7 8
It is not in contravention to the public policy surrounding the
securities laws to find that a loan participation is usually not a "se-
76. Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d at 762-63.
77. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989.
78. Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d at 763.
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curity." It is, in fact, necessary to make such a finding, and in the
best interest of the public to do so in the typical commercial loan
context for three reasons. First, consider the consequences in the
few cases where the lead lender maintains exclusive control over
the information and decision-making regarding a speculative loan.
In such circumstances, treatment of the participation interest as a
security would generally be appropriate. But that case has the po-
tential to be wrongly decided if in a few months or years there is a
general swing back to the standards applied before the Lehigh
Valley case when no loan participations were considered securities.
Such a result is possible if unjustifiable dislocations of bank deal-
ings are not confined to the cases where the securities laws have a
place.
Second, the public interest is best served by even-handed and
practical application of the securities laws only where they are
needed so that their duties and penalties are not needlessly diluted
or enforcement withheld.
Finally, there is, of course, a strong public interest in assuring
that purchasers of investments receive full and fair disclosure of
material facts. However, this laudible goal does not require banks
to be forced to needlessly curtail the economically necessary, large
financings of today's marketplace that, due to their size, occur only
through loan participations. The minimal benefit from application
of the securities laws is not worth the expense of extra documenta-
tion and delays resulting from the imposition of these additional
securities laws requirements in the typical commercial loan partici-
pation. A conclusion that a loan participation is not a security re-
quires an interpretation of the word "security" through two federal
statutory schemes which are not always consistent with each other:
the securities laws and the banking laws. In order to provide for a
peaceful co-existence between these two frameworks in the area of
loan participations, there must exist an opportunity for the bank-
ing industry to depend on and conform to not only the banking
laws but a consistent interpretation of the securities laws through
additional, more precise regulations.
It has been implied that the proposed Federal Securities Code
(FSC) eliminates the treatment of substantially all loan participa-
tions as securities. 9 One section of the FSC describes one of the
79. Participaton interests offered by a lead bank under loan agreements entered
into with borrowers in normal lending transactions are excluded securities if the
note is issued under the loan agreement in a mercantile rather than an investment
transaction and if the securities are not required to be offered pursuant to offering
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exclusions to the definition of security by stating that the defini-
tion of 'security' does not include . . . a note or evidence of in-
debtedness issued in a primarily mercantile or consumer, rather
than investment, transaction.""0  The FSC Standard, while
potentially dispositive of the loan participation as a security issue,
stands unenacted and there is no sign of such an enactment in the
near future. As such, the SEC should enact a "safe harbor" rule
which provides for the exclusion of loan participations as securities
if certain safeguards are complied with."" Under such a proposed
rule, a loan participation or similar certificate of indebtedness
which met the following standards would not be considered to fall
within the ambit of federal securities laws if:
1. the participant has reasonable access to information about
and input to enforcement of the participated loan against the
borrower (whether participant exercises the rights or not).
2. the borrower is reasonably creditworthy by local credit stan-
dards; and
3. the participated loan is reasonably secured by local credit
standards.
As with the currently existing "safe harbor" rules promulgated
by the SEC, strict compliance with each section of the rule would
be required to obtain the exemption." The establishment of such a
rule would provide banks with the opportunity to avoid the uncer-
tainty and risk involved with possible exposure to damages from a
securities law violation. While a decision from the Supreme Court
that loan participations which meet certain minimum criteria simi-
lar to those proposed above would help solidify the current trend
of the law toward the determination that generally loan participa-
tions are not securities, the Supreme Court has recently been re-
luctant to grant certiorari in these types of cases.88 Therefore, the
statements ... because offered otherwise than to institutional investors ....
304 A. LEVENSON & R. SMITH, BANKS AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 799 (Practising Law Insti-
tute 1979).
80. Fed. Sec. Code, Part II § 299.53 (b).
81. Such a rule could be similar in form and effect as that issued for private placements
as in the recently enacted Regulation D and more specifically Rule 506, the progeny of Rule
146. 47 Fed. Reg. 11266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506).
82. See 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2850, at 2929-3 (1975) for a discussion of possible
safe harbor provisions.
83. Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d
1174; American Fletcher Mortgage Co., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247. But
see Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1980), reu'd 50 U.S.L.W. 5285 (Mar. 8,
1982).
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establishment of a "safe harbor" rule for loan participants would
appear to resolve a large part of the existing controversy within
this area of the law.
